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Abstract 
Improved household accessibility to credit is identified as a significant determinant of 
intra-household re-allocation of labour resources with important implications for 
productivity, income, and poverty status. However, credit accessibility could also have 
wider impacts on poverty if it leads to new hires outside the household. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature on microcredit in two important ways: first, it 
investigates the routes through which microcredit reaches those in poverty outside the 
household. We test whether, by lending to the vulnerable non-poor, microcredit 
programmes can indirectly benefit poor labourers through increased employment. 
Second, we conduct the study in the spatial dimension of urban poverty Mexico. This is 
relevant when considering that, unlike in rural areas, labour often represents the only 
source of livelihoods to the extreme poor. Our findings point to significant trickle-down 
effects of microcredit that benefit poor labourers; however, these effects are only 
observed after loan-supported enterprising households achieve earnings well above the 
poverty line. The paper concludes with reflections on the policy implications.  
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Introduction 
 
It is now widely understood that credit markets ration loans to those in poverty. In 
developing countries in particular, credit markets suffer from informational asymmetries, 
which raise the need for collateral and therefore exclude those with low capital 
endowments. Caskey et al (2006), for instance, report that about two thirds of low-
income households living in the Metropolitan area of Mexico City were ‘unbanked’, and 
among those ‘banked’, only a small percentage had access to credit. Credit rationing 
implies that households in poverty are not able to allocate their labour resources 
optimally. In this context, the improved availability of microcredit to these groups should 
lead to a re-allocation of their labour resources, with implications for their productivity, 
income, and poverty status.  
 
The improved access to credit could in addition have a wider impact on poverty if it leads 
to new hires among fully or partially unemployed workers outside the loan-supported 
household. The existing literature on microcredit, which focuses mostly on rural areas, 
suggests that this wider impact on poverty through new hires is likely to be small at best, 
partly due to labour-market rigidities. Khandker et al (1998) for instance, find in the 
context of rural Bangladesh, an increase in self-employment as result of household 
participation in microcredit programmes, although most income-generating activities 
rarely involved workers outside the household. Dasgupta and Ray (1986) have argued 
that this is partly because at low levels of income, enterprising households can only 
afford to employ unskilled and malnourished labourers with very low productivity. 
Informational constraints regarding the productivity of potential hires may also prevent 
enterprising households from hiring labour, with self-employment perceived as the less 
risky choice. However, if the household reaches the upper limit of its available labour 
supply, then new hires can emerge as a strong alternative for production, with 
implications for the poverty status of poor labourers. Mosley and Rock (2004), for 
example, report significant impacts on poor labourers employed by loan-supported 
enterprising households, members of microcredit programmes operating in Africa. The 
extent to which microcredit leads to increased employment among the extreme poor in 
urban markets is crucial, especially as labour supply often represents the only source of 
livelihoods for this group. 
 
This paper explores this issue using primary data collected from three microcredit 
programmes operating in Mexico. The study contributes to the literature on the impact of 
microcredit on poverty in two important respects: first, the paper explores this issue in 
the spatial dimension of urban poverty. This is critical when considering that, unlike in 
rural markets; labour often represents the only source of livelihoods to the highly mobile 
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extreme poor. We exploit this spatial dimension to deal with endogeneity problems in the 
econometric estimation procedure presented in Section 3. Second, we investigate the 
routes through which microcredit reaches those in extreme poverty outside the 
household. We test whether, by lending to vulnerable non-poor enterprising households, 
microcredit organisations can indirectly benefit poor labourers through increased 
employment.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 1 presents the analytical 
framework in which the relationship between microcredit and labour supply is examined. 
Section 2 describes the quasi-experimental research design, which enables the 
empirical work to deal with selection bias and endogeneity problems. In Section 3, the 
econometric procedure is discussed, whereas in Sections 4 and 5, the impacts on labour 
supply and labour-hiring are analysed, respectively. Section 6 concludes with reflections 
on the policy implications. 
 
1. Microcredit and labour supply 
 
As a starting point for the examination of the relationship between microcredit and labour 
supply, it is useful to consider, for expositional purposes, the hypothetical case of an 
enterprising household engaging in an income generating activity to produce a market 
good y, based on a Cobb-Douglas type production function, ( , )y f L K α=  , where L   and  
K  are the quantity of labour and capital, respectively, and α  is a parameter of 
technology in the production of y. As pointed out by Pitt and Khandker (1998), it is very 
unlikely that at the bottom-end of the income distribution technology changes, at least in 
the short-term, so α  is assumed to be constant. 
 
In the production of y, the enterprising household is assumed to supply the amount of 
labour HL , constrained to the number of household members of working-age, i. This can 
be observed in the form of an upper limit of hours-work, h, and defined as 
[ ]
,
Max N ( )H
i h
L i h≥ . This constraint implies that under self-employment, labour supply is 
equal to the number of hours-work contributed by household members of working-age, 
that is, HL L= . As  α  is assumed to be constant, an injection of capital from microcredit 
should increase the labour supply up to the upper limit HL , point at which the household 
reaches an optimal allocation of internal labour resources. But if more labour is required 
due to an increase in production, then hiring labourers outside the household becomes a 
sensible choice. Note, however, that new hires are not only a function of household 
earnings from production but also of the cost of hiring efficiency labour. Leibenstein 
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(1957), Mazumdar (1959), and Dasgupta (1993) have pointed out that labour efficiency 
is conditional upon factors such as nutritional status, individual abilities, skills and efforts 
that determine labour productivity. Dasgupta and Ray (1986) have also shown that at 
low levels of household earnings, non-poor enterprising households that are considering 
employing labourers as a result of having reached their upper limit of labour supply could 
find that they can only afford to employ workers with very low productivity. Informational 
asymmetries can also constrain the demand for labour in poor areas. Bardhan and 
Rudra (1986) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) point out that households may 
perceive it too risky to employ workers of varying productivity because they do not have 
enough information about their skills, behaviour, or moral integrity, and for that reason 
they may simply choose to self-employ and produce at sub-optimal levels.  
 
Since our primary interest is not only to assess the direct effects of microcredit on labour 
supply, but also the indirect routes through which microcredit impact poor labourers hired 
by loan-supported households, we derive a cost function for efficiency units of hired 
labour, / ( )w wμ λ=  that is conditional upon the market wage rate per hour work, w , 
and unobservable factors that are related to productivity and informational constraints 
that determine labour efficiency, labour efficiency, λ . In the context of fragmented labour 
markets, these productivity and informational constraints are expected to exacerbate the 
relative cost of efficiency labour, μ , and as a result, new hires will be considered as an 
alternative for production only if enterprising households reach a minimum threshold of 
earnings, Y , the level at which they can afford to pay for this cost. 
 
New hires are observed in the form of household expenditure on labour-hiring, denoted 
by W , which is the product of units of efficiency labour hired ( hL  ) and the wage rate, 
conditional upon efficiency factors, that is, ( )hW L wλ= . This function is similar to that in 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986); however, in our case the cost function takes a maximum 
value μ   and a lower threshold that is censored at zero for households that self-employ, 
max[ / ( ),0]w wμ λ= , implying that at low levels of household earnings, from 0 to  Y  in 
the upper quadrant of Figure 1, no household hires labourers because they face high 
costs of buying efficiency units of labour, the area above μ , and hence they rely on their 
own labour resources for production, the area from 0 to HL  in the lower quadrant of 
Figure 1. But once enterprising households reach a minimum level of earnings, located 
at any point above Y , they begin to consider employing workers with a minimum level of 
skills and abilities required for production. Thus, if μ  is affordable, then household 
expenditure on labour-hiring becomes positive, i.e., 0hL > , and employment in the 
enterprise becomes H hL L L= +  . Note that the further the distance from Y   to Y , i.e., 
the higher the level of household earnings, the lower the relative cost of buying 
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additional units of efficiency labour μ  , and thus the higher the probability of observing 
new hires outside the family. Credit accessibility can play a crucial role in that process: If 
households are able to increase their earnings beyond the threshold Y  as a result of 
borrowing capital from a microcredit programme, the likelihood of indirect poverty 
impacts, through labour markets, becomes promising. In Section 2, we describe the 
research design adopted to investigate this relationship.  
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Figure 1. The relationship between household income, and expenditure on 
efficiency labour 
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2. Research design 
 
We designed a quasi-experiment that is often referred to as a posttest only quasi-
experiment, in which two groups of households are sampled: treatment and control 
(Campbell and Stanley 1966). A major problem that emerges from this type of research 
design is that the two groups of households may differ in important ways that influence 
the decision of borrowing. In other words, there might be unobservable factors related to 
individual efforts, abilities, preferences, and attitudes towards risk that affect the 
selection process and thus the outcomes of interest. We refer to this potential problem 
as a demand-related bias. A fundamental assumption here is that participation in a 
microcredit programme is always voluntary. Another potential selection problem could 
also emerge from the implicit nature of fragmented credit markets. Even if we observe a 
group of households willing to take risks and borrow from a microcredit organisation, we 
may still face selectivity discrimination made by the lender or group members that screen 
out applicants who, for instance, may live outside the market radius where the 
microcredit programme operates. We refer to this potential problem as a supply-related 
bias. In this sense, the selection process can be defined by two elements: one related to 
a household’s decision to participate or not in a microcredit program, and another 
associated with the decision of lenders (or group members) of whether or not to accept 
the applicant.  
 
In the end, we were able to specify the distribution of households that had self-selected 
to participate in the credit programme, and had been accepted by the lender or group 
members, but only with a time-variance difference that accounts for the length of 
membership. As a result, those households who had self-selected to participate in a 
credit program and had been accepted by the lender, and therefore were actively 
borrowing from the credit programme were eligible to be sampled as members of the 
treatment group. Similarly, those households who had self-selected to participate in the 
microcredit programme and had been accepted by the lender, but had just received (or 
were about to receive) the first loan by the time the study was conducted, were eligible to 
be sampled as members of the control group. This sampling strategy helped us to 
control for selection bias1.  
 
In addition, we followed a geographical and temporal identification criterion. The 
geographical criterion consisted of operationalising the quasi-experiment among 
households living in the same neighbourhood, in areas with a degree of socio-economic 
                                                 
1 Hulme and Mosley (1996) initially proposed this sample strategy in the context of impact analysis of 
microcredit. 
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homogeneity, where the comparison between treatment and control groups could be 
supported. By following this procedure, it was possible to hold constant factors such as 
infrastructure, local prices, and wages that could have otherwise exacerbated 
endogeneity problems. A high population density in urban areas made it possible to take 
this approach. The temporal criterion consisted of selecting a market area where the 
microcredit organisations had achieved a certain level of penetration and where the 
effects of microcredit could be more likely to be observed. In this sense, to have access 
to institutional information was crucial to identify the areas where the study could be 
conducted. 
 
The sampling strategy was implemented using a multistage cluster procedure: first, we 
had access to a list of programme participants (both treatment and control) from three 
case-study organisations (the clusters) who lived in the selected areas. Participants with 
loans in arrears were also included in the sample. In the second stage, both treatment 
and control groups were selected at random. We were able to sample 148 households, 
55 of which were members of Community Financial Services (Fincomun) and living in 
San Miguel Teotongo, a neighbourhood located to the eastern periphery of Mexico City; 
46 members of Centre for the Assistance of the Micro-entrepreneur (CAME) and living in 
the Chalco Valley, one of the most densely populated municipalities in the country, 
located to the eastern periphery of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City; and 47 
members of Programs for Women (Promujer), and living in Tula City and the surrounding 
areas. Thus, we have three market locations, one for each case-study microfinance 
organisation (see Table 1).  
 
It is important to point out that unlike CAME and Promujer (and most microcredit 
programmes operating in Mexico) that employ group lending methodologies, Fincomun 
mainly relies on individual lending technology, and demands as a result, physical (rather 
than social) collateral as enforcement mechanism. The inclusion of Fincomun in the 
impact study has allowed us to evaluate potential differences between group lending and 
individual lending technology regarding credit impacts on labour supply. We report our 
findings in Section 4. The questionnaire included questions on household 
characteristics, earnings, type of income generating activities, access and use of loans, 
labour supply, including hires from outside the household, wages, and other information 
needed for the purpose of the study2. In the following section, we discuss the 
econometric estimation procedure adopted to estimate the impacts of microcredit on 
labour supply. 
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of the content of the questionnaire, see Nino-Zarazua (2007) 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the case-study microcredit programmes 
Information corresponding to 2004 
 
Institutional  FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER 
Type of 
organisation Credit Union 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation 
Year of 
establishment 1994 1991 2001 
Area of 
influence 
San Miguel Teotongo, 
and other municipalities 
in the metropolitan area 
of Mexico City 
The Chalco Valley and 
a few other 
municipalities of the 
metropolitan area of 
Mexico City 
Tula City and the 
surrounding areas in 
the state of Hidalgo 
No of branches 27 5 21 
Personnel 339 580 45 
Lending 
methodology Individual lending 
Credit-only village-
banking 
Credit-plus village-
banking 
Repayment 
schedules 
16 to 24 weekly 
instalments at Fincomun 
officers or HSBC 
branches 
16 weekly instalments 
in compulsory group 
meetings. 
12 to 24 weekly or 
fortnightly instalments 
in compulsory group 
meetings 
Interest rate (per 
annum) 72% 60% 72% 
Savings as % of 
loan 10 10-12 10-12 
Physical 
collateral Yes No No 
Guarantees Yes, two guarantees Yes, through joint liability 
Yes, through joint 
liability 
Other services 
Voluntary savings 
products and certificates 
of deposits 
Life Insurance to cover 
loan balance. Extra-
loans from the internal 
revolving fund 
Training in financial 
literacy, business 
development and health 
care 
Borrowers (000) 25.8 40 11.8 
Women  
borrowers (%) 60 80 100 
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3. The econometric estimation 
 
We begin the discussion by considering the following model: 
 
  Ci C i C i iC X Z uα β γ= + + +   (1) 
  Li L i L i iL X C uα β δ= + + +   (2) 
 
where iC  measures the maximum amount of credit borrowed by household i, which is 
exogenously determined by the lender who defines that maximum threshold according to 
the level of programme participation. Note that both treatment and control groups are 
programme participants, differing only by the length of membership. Treatment 
households with say five years of membership are expected to demand (and be 
granted), larger credits than that of the control group. This is in part due to the effects of 
progressive lending, an incentive device extensively used in microcredit to increase the 
probability of loan repayment. iL  measures the number of units of efficiency labour 
invested in production, including labour-hiring, whereas iX   is a vector of household 
characteristics that contains the following factors: 1) the education of household head, 
used as a proxy of human capital endowments; 2) the dependency ratio, used as a 
measure of intra-household composition that captures the liquidity requirements for 
consumption expenditure; 3) the number of years the household has been engaged in 
income-generating activities, which is used to measure the level of production 
specialisation; 4) housing ownership, used as a measure of physical capital endowments 
in the urban context, and 5) a dummy variable reflecting whether the borrower is a 
woman (see Table 2).  
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Table 2. List of variables 
 
Impact variables Definition Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
 
LGMAXCREDIT Logarithm of the maximum 
amount of credit borrowed in 
the last credit cycle  
148 5.475 4.466 0 10.62
1 
LGMAXCREDIT† If household has been treated = 
1 148 0.608 0.490 0 1 
MEMBERSHIP Years of membership 148 1.704 1.944 0 8 
Dependent variables       
LGAGHOURSPM Logarithm of hours of labour 
invested in production, 
including labour hiring 
148 5.169 1.653 0 7.352
LGWAGEXP Logarithm of household 
expenditure on labour-hiring 
per month 
148 1.107 2.672 0 8.556
WAGEXP Household expenditure on 
labour-hiring per month (in 
pesos of 2004) 
148 314.29
05 
903.98
44 
0 5200 
SCHOOLING If household has stop sending 
children to school = 1 
148 0.270 0.446 0 1 
LGEARNINGS Logarithm of household 
earnings per month 
148 8.0879 1.016 5.011 10.15
0 
 
EARNINGS Household earnings per month 
(in pesos of 2004) 
148 4990.7
3 
4721.0
16 
150 25600
Independent variables       
Contained in iX        
AVEDU Years of education  148 7.047 3.777 0 17 
HOWNER If household owns residence = 
1 
148 0.682 0.467 0 1 
TIMEBUS Years in business 148 5.162 5.746 0 30 
DEPENDRATIO Dependency ratio (number of 
children, students and old 
members / household size) 
148 0.498 0.222 0.125 1 
WOMAN If borrower is woman = 1 148 0.730 0.446 0 1 
Contained in iK        
FORMALCREDIT If borrower have received loans 
from institutional lenders = 1 
148 0.054 0.227 0 1 
MONEYLENDER If borrower have received loans 
from moneylenders 
148 0.095 0.294 0 1 
GROUP       
LGRATE      Logarithm of interest rate 148 3.151   0.041   3.091  3.178
Instrumental variable       
DISTANCE Distance from branch to place 
of residence or business (in 
minutes) 
148 32.365 21.716 10 100 
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iZ   is an observable variable distinct from those in iX   that affects the demand for credit   
but not iL , and which plays the role of the identifying instrument. The rationale behind 
including iZ   in equation (1) relies on the fact that although we were able to control for 
self-selectivity through the research design itself, we could still encounter endogeneity 
problems if the explanatory variable iC  in equation (2) is correlated with unobservable 
factors included in the error term. In other words, there might be unmeasured factors 
related to, for example, cost of inputs, local prices, and local infrastructure that could be 
responsible for endogeneity problems. If that were the case, then the use of ordinary 
least square estimators would not only produce biased estimates, but they would also be 
inconsistent. The instrumental variable must be partially correlated with iC , that is, the 
coefficient on iZ  must be nonzero, 0γ ≠ , so ( , ) 0Ci iCov Z u ≠ , while iZ  must be 
uncorrelated with iL , that is, ( , ) 0
L
i iCov Z u = . Thus, selecting an appropriate instrument 
becomes a crucial and complex task for the estimation procedure. In order to test for 
endogeneity, we initially followed a Hausman specification procedure (Hausman 1978), 
in which a linear projection of (1) is estimated, including the instrumental variable Z , to 
obtain the reduced form coefficients. Since ( , ) 0Li iCov Z u = , then we can get the 
predicted residuals, iR  , which in turn are included in equation (2) alongside the rest of 
the explanatory variables as follows:  
 
  i L i L i i iL X C R eα β δ υ= + + + +    (3) 
 
where ( )L Li i i ie u E u R≡ −  and ( , )i ie R   are assumed to be independent of iX  , that is, 
( , ) 0i i iE e X R = . A simple way to test for endogeneity is under the null of no 
endogeneity, 0 : 0H υ = , following the usual 2SLS heteroskedasticity-robust t statistic. 
This is similar to the method proposed by Heckman (1979); in which the maximum 
amount of credit borrowed, iC , in (1) is transformed into a dichotomous variable, iI , with 
value = 1I  for treatment households and = 0I  for the corresponding control group. 
Since both groups are programme participants, then the function of labour supply in (2) 
can be derived as 1 1 1i i i iL X I uβ δ= + +  for treatment households, and as  
2 2 2i i iL X uβ= +   for the control group, where  
  
( ) ( ) ( )*1 2 1 21 0i i i i i i iE L I E L I X Z Z Vβ β σ φ γ γ= − = = − + Φ +  (4) 
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and  ( )φ ⋅  and ( )Φ ⋅  are the density of the distribution function and the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal, respectively. Note that ( ) 0E V =  , whereas   
*
2 1( )ε εσ σ σ= − is derived from the covariance matrix as in Maddala (1977:261), which 
enables us to estimate the inverse Mills ratio, ( ) ( ) ( )λ φ⋅ ≡ ⋅ Φ ⋅ , resulting from the 
relationship between ( )φ ⋅   and ( )Φ ⋅ . As Heckman suggests, we can estimate the  'sβ  
and γ   by exploiting the properties of the first stage Probit in order to obtain the inverse 
Mills ratio. In the second stage least square procedure, we obtain consistent β  ’s and 
the parameter of interest, δ  , by adding the inverse Mills ratio in (2) as follows:  
 
 M Li L i L i iL X I uα β δ λ= + + + +  (5) 
 
which is similar to the Hausman procedure discussed above; however, the 2SLS 
heteroskedasticity-robust t statistic is applied now on the inverse Mills ratio: when 0λ ≠ , 
we have endogeneity problems.  
 
Since we were interested in examining the impacts of credit over time, our survey 
collected a continuous variable that captures the length of membership, and which 
measures the number of years of programme participation. This variable, iM  , was 
included in equation (1) to substitute iC  as the impact variable. However, because 
borrowers that had just joined the microcredit programme integrate into our control 
group, iM  takes now a maximum value and a lower threshold zero in the form of a 
censored variable with value 0iM >  for treatment households and 0iM =   for control 
groups. For this particular reason, we adopt a Tobit approach (Tobin 1958), which 
implies that the probability of observing 0iM >   and 0iM =  is ( )φ ⋅ , and 
*( 0) (0)ip M < = Φ  , respectively, where ( )φ ⋅   and ( )Φ ⋅   denote the density function and 
the cumulative density function of the standard normal. These assumptions are very 
similar to those implied in the Heckman procedure, however, now the log-likelihood 
function takes the form: 
 
0 0
ln ln ln 1
i i
i i M i M
M M
M X XL β βσ φ σ σ> =
⎛ − ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + + −Φ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑   (6) 
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that generates the conditional mean function of the observed dependent variable iM   
that can be used to estimate the determinants of the length of membership by treatment 
and control groups alike3 , through the estimation of the marginal effects of iX   on iM  , 
that is, ( )i i i M i ME M X X Xβ β σ∂ ⎡ ⎤ ∂ = Φ⎣ ⎦  . This allows us to re-estimate equation (1) 
as: 
 
 Mi M i M i iM X Z uα β γ= + + +   (7) 
 
 
and the labour supply equation in (3) as: 
 
 i L i L i i iL X M Rα β δ ν ε= + + + +   (8) 
 
where iR   and ν  are the predicted Tobit residuals and their parameter estimate, 
respectively. Note that ( )L Li i i iu E u Rε ≡ − , where ( , )i iRε  are assumed to be 
independent of iX , that is, ( , ) 0i i iE X Rε = . The predicted residuals, which are 
estimated from the Tobit equation in (7) are then included in (8) as another regressor in 
order to test, in similar fashion as in the Hausman procedure, the null of no endogeneity. 
This type of method is what Amemiya (1984) has referred to as the Type III Tobit Model.  
 
For empirical assessment, we have included in (1) and (7) a vector of credit market 
characteristics, iK , that captures the effect of credit from moneylenders and other 
organisations such as savings and credit associations. The rationale behind including   
iK  in the impact equation relies on the fact that if we do not control for the effects of 
agents that actively compete with microcredit programmes, then the parameter δ   may 
be inconsistent, that is, we could wrongly attribute an outcome to the microcredit 
programme when in fact it comes from, for example, a moneylender. In addition, we 
have included a dummy variable that measures the effect of group lending with 
reference to individual lending, and which is used to assess the effectiveness of 
                                                 
3 McDonald and Moffitt (1980) have decomposed equation (6) into two parts to obtain the effects of a 
change in iX  on 1) the conditional mean of iM , and 2) the probability that the observation will fall in the 
part of the distribution where 0iM > . 
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alternative lending technologies in the context of urban poverty. As discussed in Section 
2, this was feasible due to the inclusion of Fincomun in the impact study.  
  
3.1 The identifying instrument 
 
As instrumental variable, we identified a continuous variable that measures the time 
participants spend travelling from the place they live (or work) to the branch, used as a 
proxy for accessibility (in term of distance) to credit, capturing the spatial dimension of 
urban credit markets4 . Our argument relies on the fact that, as an exogenous rule 
determined by the lender, microcredit programmes usually concentrate on a determined 
geographical space in order to reduce the informational costs that are related to 
screening, monitoring, and enforcement activities, and hence restrict programme 
participation to households living within a given operational radius. This is particularly 
true when considering that periodical repayment schedules are extensively used as a 
monitoring device among microcredit programmes in Mexico and elsewhere. Other 
studies have employed instrumental variables that response to specific market, 
infrastructure, and demographic attributes that predominantly reflect rural conditions, 
such as land ownership (e.g. Pitt and Khandker 1998) and household eligibility at the 
village level (e.g. Zaman 1999). However, given the urban characteristic of our study, 
these instruments would have been, if adopted, inappropriate for empirical analysis.  
 
When equation (1) was estimated following the Hausman, Heckman and Tobit 
procedures, the p-values of the t statistic for the coefficient γ   rejected the null of 
0 : 0H γ = , reflecting the statistically significance correlation between the level borrowing 
and the identifying instrument; however, when the instrument was included in equation 
(2), the parameter estimate  γ  accepted the null of no correlation against iL   (see Table 
3) 5. As a result, we were able to use distance as the identifying instrument to test for the 
underlying assumption of no endogeneity. 
                                                 
4 The mean value for this time-dimensional variable was 22 minutes for an outward journey. 
 
5 We adopted Lawrence Klein’s rule of thumb (1961), to test the instrumental variable for potential 
collinearity problems; however, we did not find evidence of severe collinearity. 
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Table 3. Identification of DISTANCE as instrumental variable 
 
Dependent variable in (1): logarithm of the maximum amount of credit (LGMAXCREDIT). 
Note, however, that the Heckman procedure transforms LGMAXCREDIT into a dummy 
variable for treatment group = 1 if Ii > 0. Dependent variable in (2): logarithm of units of 
labour (LGAGHOURSPM) 
   
 Heckman Hausman Tobit 
 Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) 
DISTANCE 0.007 -0.004 0.012 -0.003 0.012 -0.002 
 (4.28)*** (1.29) (4.54)*** (1.15) (1.76)* (0.78) 
LGMAXCREDIT  0.036  0.138   
  (2.33)**  (1.96)*   
MEMBERSHIP      0.080 
      (1.92)* 
LGRATE -1.508 -7.156 -10.280 -6.392 -14.485 -6.936 
 (1.20) (3.59)*** (4.06)*** (3.08)*** (2.99)*** (3.44)*** 
TIMEBUS 0.001 0.025 0.002 0.025 0.004 0.025 
 (0.15) (2.04)** (0.15) (2.00)** (0.13) (2.02)** 
AVEDU -0.009 -0.012 -0.006 -0.013 -0.045 -0.012 
 (0.74) (0.71) (0.31) (0.78) (1.06) (0.67) 
HOWNER 0.060 0.094 0.250 0.086 0.597 0.086 
 (0.62) (0.67) (1.54) (0.59) (1.63) (0.60) 
DEPENDRATIO -0.050 0.205 -0.466 0.239 -0.267 0.175 
 (0.25) (0.76) (1.40) (0.87) (0.35) (0.64) 
WOMAN 0.156 -0.136 0.144 -0.094 1.119 -0.136 
 (1.40) (0.91) (0.68) (0.64) (2.66)*** (0.88) 
FORMALCREDIT -0.183 -0.209 -0.674 -0.176 -0.998 -0.214 
 (1.07) (1.33) (2.72)*** (0.99) (1.33) (1.30) 
MONEYLENDER -0.369 0.139 -0.280 0.082 -1.416 0.092 
 (2.68)*** (0.82) (1.03) (0.47) (2.24)** (0.54) 
GROUP -0.163 -0.548 -1.417 -0.436 -1.025 -0.571 
 (1.40) (2.51)** (7.71)*** (1.75)* (2.30)** (2.56)** 
CONSTANT  28.228 41.394 24.742 46.003 27.621 
  (4.44)*** (5.19)*** (3.64)*** (3.00)*** (4.30)*** 
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 148 
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.10 0.24 0.35 0.23 0.05 0.22 
Wald / F / LR Chi2 30.77 3.70 14.21 3.40 24.77 3.18 
Prob>chi2 / >F / >chi 
2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 
Robust z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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As both the inverse Mills ratio and the predicted residuals presented in Table 4 report 
significant parameter estimates, there seems to be unobservable factors relegated to the 
error terms affecting the labour supply function. As a result, the null of no endogeneity is 
rejected and hence the attention is focused on the results from equations (3), (5) and (8) 
rather than (2). Note however, that under the Heckman (equation 5), the parameter δ    
measures the average impact of programme participation on labour supply; however, it 
does not take into account the effect of progressive lending. Borrowers with say five 
years of programme participation are expected to report greater impacts than those 
borrowers with just one or two years of membership. The inclusion of equations (3) and 
(8) in the impact analysis, in which the slope coefficient δ  captures the effect of the 
maximum amount of credit borrowed and the length of membership, respectively, has 
allowed us to overcome this constraint. For that reason, Hausman and Tobit are the 
preferred methods for analysis, although we present them alongside the Heckman model 
for comparative purposes. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4 and 
presented in Table 3.  
 
4. The impact of microcredit on labour supply  
 
As both the units of labour supplied, iL  , and the maximum amount of credit, iC , are in 
logarithmic form, the parameter estimate  δ  in equation (3) measures the elasticities of 
latent units of labour  (in hours) invested with respect to credit. The slope coefficient 
reports a positive sign and statistical significance, although the magnitude of the 
responsiveness is inelastic. More precisely, the results suggest that if the maximum 
amount of credit goes up by one percent, the units of labour supplied is predicted to 
increase in the order of 0.42 percent, ceteris paribus. The results from the Heckman 
procedure in (4) report the difference in the mean log of units of labour, which can be 
used to estimate the percentage change in units of efficiency labour supplied by 
treatment households relative to the control group. In order to do so, we followed 
Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) to obtain the antilog of δ  as follows: 0.042( ) 1.0428e = , 
suggesting that the median value of hours of labour supplied by a treatment household 
in the production of a market good is higher than that of the control groups by about 4.3 
percent, ceteris paribus.  
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Table 4. The impact of credit on labour supply  
 
Dependent variable in (1): logarithm of the maximum amount of credit (LGMAXCREDIT)† 
Dependent variable in (7): length of membership in years (MEMBERSHIP). 
Dependent variable in (3), (5), and (8): logarithm of units of labour (LGAGHOURSPM).  
 
 Reduced form equations Impact equations  
 Hausman Eq. (1) 
Heckman 
Eq. (1) 
Tobit 
Eq. (7) 
Hausman 
Eq. (3) 
Heckman 
Eq. (5) 
Tobit 
Eq. (8) 
LGMAXCREDIT    0.421 0.042  
    (2.93)*** (2.71)***  
MEMBERSHIP      0.091 
      (1.71)* 
GROUP -1.417 -0.163 -1.025 -0.144 -0.179 -0.162 
 (7.71)*** (1.40) (2.30)** (0.77) (1.12) (1.02) 
AVEDU -0.006 -0.009 -0.045 -0.009 -0.015 -0.001 
 (0.31) (0.74) (1.06) (0.52) (0.90) (0.08) 
HOWNER 0.250 0.060 0.597 0.000 0.123 -0.029 
 (1.54) (0.62) (1.63) (0.00) (0.83) (0.18) 
DEPENDRATIO -0.466 -0.050 -0.267 0.507 0.302 0.335 
 (1.40) (0.25) (0.35) (1.67)* (1.02) (1.14) 
WOMAN 0.144 0.156 1.119 -0.184 -0.290 -0.410 
 (0.68) (1.40) (2.66)*** (1.23) (2.07)** (2.61)** 
TIMEBUS 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.024 0.024 0.023 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (1.84)* (2.00)** (1.74)* 
FORMALCREDIT -0.674 -0.183 -0.998    
 (2.72)*** (1.07) (1.33)    
MONEYLENDER -0.280 -0.369 -1.416    
 (1.03) (2.68)*** (2.24)**    
LGRATE -10.280 -1.508 -14.485    
 (4.06)*** (1.20) (2.99)***    
DISTANCE 0.012 0.007 0.012    
 (4.54)*** (4.28)*** (1.76)*    
INVERSE MILLS RATIO     -0.556  
     (2.49)**  
PREDICTED RESIDUALS    -0.287  -0.171 
    (1.83)*  (1.95)* 
CONSTANT 41.394  46.003 1.712 4.994 5.434 
 (5.19)***  (3.00)*** (1.28) (19.23)*** (22.85)*** 
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 148 
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.35 0.10 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.15 
F test / LR Chi2 14.21 30.77 24.77 3.55 3.61 3.06 
Prob > F / Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.003 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
† Note that the Heckman procedure transforms LGMAXCREDIT into a dummy variable for 
treatment group = 1 if Ii > 0 
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Similarly, the parameter estimate δ   in equation (8) captures the semilog of units of 
efficiency labour with respect to the length of membership. This implies that the slope 
coefficient of iM   measures the constant proportional or relative change in the number 
of units of efficiency labour for a given absolute change in the length of programme 
participation. The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, the number of units of efficiency 
labour supplied by enterprising households increases, on average, at the annual rate of 
9.1 percent after joining the microcredit programme. In order to estimate the growth rate 
over the period of time treatment households had borrowed from the credit programme, 
we compute the compound rate of growth using the antilog of δ  as follows: [(antilog(δ )-
1)x100]. Our results predict an annual growth rate in units of efficiency labour in the 
order of 9.5 percent, which is slightly higher than that of 9.1 percent obtained from the 
instantaneous estimation. Since the constant reflects the log of units of labour invested 
at the beginning of programme participation, then by taking its antilog we can estimate 
the average number of hours invested by control households. We predicted this value at 
approximately 228 hours per month. In this sense, after one year of programme 
participation an enterprising household is able to increase, on average, the number of 
units of labour invested in production from 228 to 250 hours per month. 
 
It is apparent that not only access to credit but also the length of programme 
membership is associated with improvements in the allocation of labour resources. An 
increased allocation of labour resources could nonetheless have adverse effects if this 
increase translates into a higher propensity of child labour particularly in the absence of 
appropriate enforcement of school attendance norms. While raising household income 
and reducing poverty in the short run, child labour will negatively affect human capital 
accumulation and therefore long-term sustained exit from poverty. Our argument relies 
on the strong association between school attainment and labour productivity reported in 
Spence (1973) and Schultz (1988). However, empirical evidence does not support the 
assumption of adverse effects, as the relationship between microcredit and schooling is 
being reported to be positive and significant (see Niño-Zarazúa 2007).  
 
An increased allocation of labour resources could also reveal, as discussed earlier, 
some indirect routes through which microcredit impact poor labourers hired by loan-
supported enterprising households. In order to explore this issue, we collected 
information about household expenditure on labour-hiring, which is computed as the 
product of the number of units of labour hired and the wage rate paid per unit of labour,  
( )hW L wλ= 6. In an initial examination, we found that just about 15 percent of the 
sample of enterprising households did actually hire labourers outside the family. Note 
                                                 
6 Since we cannot observe λ, we assume that this factor is captured by the wage rate w. 
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that this is in line with the cost function of efficiency labour discussed earlier in section 1, 
in which   iW  takes a maximum value and a lower threshold zero in the form 
*max( ,0)i iW W=  ; with value * 0iW >   if a household reports expenditure on labour-
hiring, and * 0iW =  , otherwise. Since we encounter a censored sample problem, we 
follow a method similar to the first-stage Tobit selection equation specified in equation 
(7) but now taking the form: 
w
i w i w i w iW Y X uα ψ β= + + +     (9)  
 
where  Y  is a continuous variable measuring monthly household earnings, and X   is 
the same vector of household characteristics derived in (7).  wα , wψ  , wβ   and  wiu  are, 
respectively the intercept, slope coefficients and error term. Because we have a data-
censoring case demanding a homoskedastic normal distribution, we transform iW   into 
logarithmic form to make this assumption more reasonable. The reason for following a 
standard Tobit reflects our interest in analysing the conditional mean function of 
household expenditure on labour-hiring, which is censored at zero for households with 
no labour hiring, but has disturbances normally distributed. Note that the use of least 
squares for the sub-sample for which * 0iW >   would have produced inconsistent and 
bias estimators (Greene 2003). The empirical results are presented in the following 
section. 
 
5. The impact of microcredit on labour hiring 
 
As both expenditure on labour hiring and earnings are in logarithmic form, the parameter 
estimate ψ   in equation (9) measures the elasticity of latent expenditure on efficiency 
labour with respect to household earnings (equation 9c in Table 5). This equation 
captures the indirect route through which microcredit impacts household expenditure on 
labour: If microcredit becomes a significant determinant in rising household earnings (as 
reported in Nino-Zarazua 2007), then it is reasonable to assume that after reaching the 
upper limit of labour supply (and crossing a minimum level of earnings,  at which the cost 
of buying efficiency units of labour is affordable), enterprising households may begin to 
consider hiring labourers outside the family.  
 
We have also estimated equation (9) with, iC   and  iM  as explanatory variables in an 
attempt to capture any direct link between labour-hiring and microcredit. In the former 
case, the slope coefficient measures the elasticity of household’s expenditure on labour-
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hiring with respect to credit (equation 9a in Table 5), whereas in the latter case, the slope 
coefficient captures the effect of one additional year of programme participation on the 
number of units of labour hired (equation 9b in Table 5). The results are presented in 
Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Determinant of labour expenditure 
 
Dependent variable in (9a -10c): logarithm of household expenditure on labour.  
Dependent variable in (9d): household expenditure on labour in pesos of 2004  
 
 Tobit  
eq. (9a) 
Tobit 
 eq. (9b) 
Tobit  
eq. (9c) 
Tobit 
 eq. (9d) 
LGMAXCREDIT 2.660    
 (1.77)*    
MEMBERSHIP  1.120   
  (0.97)   
LGEARNINGS   5.811  
   (3.02)***  
EARNINGS    0.278 
    (3.56)*** 
TIMEBUS 0.461 0.444 0.310 52.175 
 (1.99)** (1.92)* (1.45) (0.80) 
AVEDU 0.575 0.565 0.275 84.117 
 (1.55) (1.51) (0.82) (0.82) 
HOWNER -2.900 -2.158 -2.457 -607.976 
 (0.91) (0.67) (0.85) (0.71) 
DEPENDRATIO 1.807 -0.093 2.119 232.882 
 (0.29) (0.01) (0.37) (0.13) 
WOMAN -6.981 -7.771 -3.909 -1,247.087 
 (2.02)** (2.13)** (1.26) (1.32) 
GROUP -0.519 -1.764 -1.529 -39.583 
 (0.15) (0.53) (0.51) (0.04) 
CONSTANT -35.273 -11.596 -58.408 -4,500.426 
 (2.23)** (2.05)** (3.23)*** (2.71)*** 
Observations 148 148 148 148 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.05 
LR Chi2 16.35 13.90 26.49 25.58 
Prob > chi2 0.022 0.053 0.000 0.000 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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The empirical evidence show that a one percent increase in the amount of credit 
borrowed gives rise to a 2.6 percent in expenditure on labour hiring, and the results are 
statistically significant at 10 percent level; however, when the same equation was 
estimated with the length of membership as the impact variable (Equation 9b in Table 5), 
the slope coefficient became statistically insignificant, although its magnitude suggests 
that there might be a positive impact of the length of programme participation on labour 
hiring. Our results thus are inconclusive in attempting to confirm any direct impact of 
microcredit on labour-hiring. We infer that the statistical insignificance of iM    might 
reflect the small number of households in the sample that did actually hired labourers, 
although similar results have been reported elsewhere (see e.g. Mosley and Rock 2004).  
 
We find, however, a large and significant elasticity of expenditure on labour-hiring with 
respect to household earnings. Other things held constant, a one percent increase in 
household earnings is predicted to give rise to a 5.8 percent increase in expenditure on 
labour hiring. Our results support the hypothesis of an indirect route through which 
microcredit could impact labour hiring: if by borrowing capital, enterprising households 
are able to boost their earnings, then an increasing probability of labour expenditure is 
observed. The large elasticity reported can be explained by the low wage rate paid to 
labourers relative to household earnings, reflecting the degree of welfare inequality in 
urban poverty Mexico. The results also suggest a downward effect of group lending on 
hires relative to individual lending, although the statistical insignificance cannot confirm 
this difference. Notice that most variables contained in the vector of household 
characteristics fail to report significant coefficients, a fact that might be reflecting the 
relative homogeneity among households participating in our study.  
 
Although the computed elasticities reported in Table 5 provide valuable information 
about the relationship between household earnings and expenditure on labour, we still 
do not know at what level of earnings enterprising households begin to consider hiring 
labourers. The importance of identifying that minimum level is obvious: If labour-hiring 
emerges after households have achieved earnings above the poverty line, and if poverty 
targeting is widely adopted by microcredit programmes due to donor conditionality or 
organisational goals, the impact of microcredit on poverty through new hires could be 
prevented. In order to estimate that minimum level of earnings, we transformed the logs 
of iW   and iY  into linear variables, and computed equation (9) accordingly. The results 
are shown in Figure 2 and in  equation 9d, Table 5. 
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Figure 2. The relationship between household earnings and expenditure 
on labour-hiring (Figures in pesos of 2004)
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Note that the slope coefficient ψ  reports now the predicted values of an absolute 
change in household expenditure on labour-hiring conditional on an absolute change in 
earnings. As we hypothesized graphically in Figure 1, at low levels of household 
earnings, no household is willing to hire labourers for a relative high cost of buying 
efficiency units of labour, and therefore, self-employment remains dominant. Enterprising 
households will hire labourers only after reaching a minimum level of earnings, level at 
which households minimise the cost of efficiency units of labour. This level is graphically 
represented by Y   in Figure 1. We envisage that level of household earnings as a 
platform for employment generation. Our estimations suggest that this platform is located 
in the context of urban Mexico, at about 16,250 pesos per month (around 1480 dollars). 
It is important to point out that this level of household earnings is well above the poverty 
line, in fact, about three times the capability-based poverty line ( 2z  ) derived for urban 
areas in Mexico, which is a threshold that adds to the food-based poverty line ( 1z ) that 
measures extreme deprivation, a non-food component that includes expenditure on 
clothing, housing, health care, formal instruction, and public transport (see Sedesol 
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2002)7. After reaching that platform of earnings, the propensity of household expenditure 
on labour becomes positive and significant: a one-peso increase in the level of 
household earnings is predicted to give rise to 28 cents of labour expenditure, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
It is apparent thus that at low levels of earnings, the cost of hiring units of efficiency 
labour is too high as an option for production, due to either productivity factors or 
informational asymmetries. In the context of Africa, Mosley and Rock (2004:477) report 
vulnerable non-poor enterprising households being reluctant to employ workers due to “a 
very considerable perceived risk associated with the initiation of financial relationships 
going outside the family.” Our study reveals that the vulnerable non-poor consider hiring 
labourers only after reaching the upper limit of labour supply (depicted at HL  in Figure 
1), at the point where households have achieved a welfare status well above the poverty 
line. To illustrate this, take the following case:  
 
Mr A. lives with his mother and two younger sisters in San Miguel Teotongo, to the 
Eastern area of Mexico City. He runs a small grocery in a neighbourhood located about 
40 minutes from the place of residence. He is the only source of household income. As a 
competitive strategy, he offers a 24-hours service, 7 days a week, and in order to keep 
running the business throughout the night, he hires two labourers. He pays 850 pesos 
(some US $76) for 40 hours per week. This wage is about twice the capability-based 
poverty line derived for urban areas in Mexico. The monthly earnings reported by Mr A 
are in the order of US $1728, which correspond, after being weighted by equivalence 
factors as in Rothbarth (1943), to about 3.15 times the poverty line. When questioned 
about the reasons of hiring labourers, Mr. A replied: “The business has been growing 
and I wanted to offer longer opening hours, but I cannot work 24 hours, you know. My 
sisters and my mother cannot help me either. It is too dangerous for them to work at 
nights. That is why I decided to hire my employees...” 
 
Although we found no evidence of poor households hiring labourers, we did find that 
almost one-third of labourers hired by loan-supported (and non-poor) enterprising 
households were suffering from extreme deprivation, that is, with incomes below 1z
8, 
                                                 
7 This poverty line is estimated at 6570 pesos per month for an average household, which is the product of 
the capability-based poverty line derived at 1507.5 pesos of 2004 and the household size, which is weighted 
by equivalence factors as in Rothbarth (1943). 
 
8 The food-based poverty line is derived from a basic food basket with a value estimated at 784.5 pesos of 
2004. 
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whereas 60 percent of hires reported incomes below an asset-based poverty line ( 3z
9)  
that measures ‘moderate’ poverty in urban Mexico (see Sedesol 2002). Important 
differences were also identified between treatment and control groups in relation to the 
wage paid to poor labourers: taking the capability-based poverty line as reference, we 
observed that poor labourers employed by treatment households received wages 25% 
above that poverty line, whereas the corresponding control groups paid wages far below 
that threshold, in the order of 64 percent of the poverty line. In fact, we identified a 
significant association at the 0.05 percent level between treatment and control groups in 
relation to the units of labour hired. Labourers employed by treatment households 
worked on average 34 hours per week with reference to 20 hours reported from workers 
employed by control groups (see Table 6). It is apparent thus that by participating in a 
microcredit programme, non-poor enterprising households may increase their labour 
supply up to a level that ultimately benefits poor labourers. But although wage 
differences are associated to the intensity of labour, efficiency factors may also be 
driving up the wage rate. In the following section, we briefly discuss our findings. 
 
                                                 
9 The asset-based poverty line is derived by adding to the food-based poverty line, a mean value of a non-
food expenditure component, y following the Engel method. This threshold of ‘moderate’ poverty is set at 
1881 pesos of 2004 
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Table 6. Relationship between programme participation and labour  
 Treatment  
 
Control
 
Self-employed per household (average)  1.60 1.35 
Self-employment as % of income sources 75.39 69.37 
Employers as proportion of total borrowers (%) 15.56 13.79 
Labourers per employer (average)  1.5 1.3 
Hours worked per week 34*** 19.72 
Wage paid as % of the food-based poverty line (784.5 pesos per 
month) 240.39*** 123.70 
Wage paid as % of the capability-based poverty line (1507.5 pesos 
per month) 125.10*** 64.37 
Wage paid as % of the asset-based poverty line (1881 pesos per 
month) 100.26*** 51.59 
Statistical association indicated by the Chi-square values for the cell as a whole at 0.001 
(*); 0.01 (**); 0.05 (***); and 0.1 (****) levels of significance. 
 
5.1 Labour intensity vs. labour efficiency 
As household expenditure on labour is given by the product ( )hL wλ , where hL   is the 
number of units of labour hired, and ( )wλ , the wage rate per unit of labour, conditional 
on efficiency factors, we can derive the elasticity coefficients of the wage rate, relative to 
the number of units of labour hired, (ln ) / (ln )hd w d L 10, in order to estimate the relative 
change in labour efficiency among poor labourers. If the elasticity is greater than one, 
then efficiency factors may be driving up the wage rate. Our estimations report an 
elasticity equal to 1.19, with a slope coefficient significant at 1 percent level (t–statistic= 
5.73, p= 0.00) , suggesting that non-poor enterprising households not only increase 
expenditure on labour as a result of higher labour intensity, but also due to efficiency 
factors. However, the proximity of the elasticity to the unity implies that such efficiency 
factors (if any) are rather modest. Nonetheless, due to data constraints, we were unable 
to explore this issue in more detail, leaving it as an area for future research.  
 
6. Concluding remarks  
 
Our study has provided insights into the dynamics involving credit markets and labour, 
with important implications for poverty policy. First, after controlling for endogeneity 
constraints, we find positive and significant impacts of microcredit on labour supply that 
are associated to the length of programme participation. This implies that not only credit 
access but also membership duration is an important determinant in an increased 
                                                 
10 The statistics of the regression equations are: F(1, 20) = 32.81, p = 0.00; R2 = 0.52 
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allocation of labour resources, with implications for the welfare status of loan-supported 
enterprising households.  
 
Second, an increased allocation of labour resources has also revealed indirect routes 
through which microcredit impact extreme poverty in urban settings: If by borrowing 
capital, enterprising households increase the levels of output to such extent that they 
cannot supply by themselves the required units of labour for production, then the 
marginal propensity to hiring labour becomes significant. We observed that behaviour 
only after households had crossed a minimum income threshold, at a level 
approximately three times as high as the poverty line. We envisage that income 
threshold as a platform for employment generation in the context of fragmented urban 
labour markets. 
 
Third, we find significant differences between wages paid by treatment and control 
households. While labourers employed by control groups received wages well below the 
poverty line, labourers hired by treatment households reported wages above such a 
threshold. Two factors appear to explain wage differences. The first is associated with 
labour intensity: Labourers hired by treatment households report more hours at work vis-
à-vis labourers hired by control groups. The second is associated to labour efficiency: 
We find an elastic response of wages relative to the number of hours worked, suggesting 
that there might be efficiency factors driving up the wage rate.  
 
The implications for policy are relevant in the sense that poverty targeting in microcredit 
delivery may actually miss out important trickle-down effects through labour markets that 
can benefit poor labourers. Thus, by flexibilising poverty targeting and extending the 
breadth of the targeting population to the vulnerable non-poor and non-poor, microcredit 
programmes could indirectly contribute to alleviate poverty in urban environments where 
labour often represent the only source of livelihoods to the extreme poor. 
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